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FDI investors control the management of the firms, whereas FPI investors delegate decisions to managers.
Therefore,  direct investors are more informed than portfolio investors about the prospects of projects.
This information enables them to manage their projects more efficiently. However, if investors need
to sell their investments before maturity because of liquidity shocks, the liquidation price they can
get will be lower when buyers know that they have more information on investment projects. In this
paper we examine the choice between Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment
at the level of the source country. Based on the Goldstein and Razin model, we predict that (1) source
countries with higher expectation of future liquidity problems export relatively more FPI than FDI,
and (2) this effect strengthens as the source country’s capital market transparency worsens. To test
these hypotheses, we examine the variation of FPI relative to FDI for source countries from 1985 to
2004. Our key variable is the predicted severity of liquidity shock, as proxied by episodes of economy-wide
sales of external assets. Consistent with our theory, we find that the predicted liquidity shock has a
strong effect on the composition of foreign equity investment. Furthermore, greater capital market
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The liberalization of international capital markets gave rise to large amounts of international equity
ﬂows in recent years. These ﬂows seem to have had a major impact on the cost of capital, on the
volatility of capital markets, and even on economic growth.1 In assessing the costs and beneﬁts of
the globalization of international equity markets, it is important to take account of the composition
of international equity ﬂows. These ﬂows generally take two forms: Foreign Direct Investments
(FDI) — that usually involve a control position by the foreign investor — and Foreign Portfolio
Investments (FPI) — that do not involve a control position. It is well known that these two forms
of investment generate very diﬀerent implications for the stability of international capital markets
and of host countries. For example, during ﬁnancial crises, FPI investors usually rush to liquidate
their investments, whereas FDI is much more resilient and thus contributes to the stability of the
host country (see: Frankel and Rose, 1996; Lipsey, 2001; and Sarno and Taylor, 1999).
Despite the importance of the distinction between FDI and FPI, not much is known about the
factors that guide the choice of international investors between them. Traditionally, Multinationals
engaged in FDI, while collective investment funds— including private equity funds, mutual funds
and hedge funds — engaged in FPI. In such a world, investors seeking international exposure had
to choose between investing in multinationals or in investment funds. This choice inﬂuenced the
composition of equity ﬂows between FDI and FPI. More recently, the choice between FDI and FPI
has become even more direct, as collective investment funds became sources of FDI and started
competing with traditional multinationals in acquiring foreign companies.2
The goal of this paper is to shed empirical light on the factors that aﬀect the choice between
FDI and FPI at the level of the source country. Our focus is on the eﬀect of liquidity. The basic
idea is that FDI investments are illiquid and more diﬃcult to sell, and thus FPI investments become
more desirable in the face of expected liquidity needs.
Our hypotheses are based on an extension of Goldstein and Razin (2006), which we develop
1See, for example, Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Errunza and Miller (2000), Henry (2000), Chari and Henry (2004),
and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005). Stulz (2005) reviews the development of ﬁnancial globalization and its
limitations.
2According to the 2006 World Investment Report, collective investment funds have become growing sources of
FDI. These funds raised an amount of $261 billion in 2005 from institutional investors, such as banks, pension funds
and insurance companies. About half of the funds raised were then used towards FDI. Moreover, their main type
of FDI, cross-border M&As, reached $135 billion and accounted for as much as 19% of total cross-border M&As in
2005.
1formally in the appendix. In the Goldstein and Razin (2006) model, FDI investors are more
informed than FPI investors about the prospects of the ﬁrms they invest in. This information
enables direct investors to manage their projects more eﬃciently. This informational advantage,
however, comes at a cost. If investors need to sell their investments before maturity because of
liquidity shocks, the price they can get will be typically lower when buyers know that they have
more information on the fundamentals of the investment project. A key implication of the model is
that the choice between FDI and FPI will be linked to the likelihood with which investors expect
to get a liquidity shock.
To provide better link to the data, we extend the Goldstein and Razin (2006) model by making
the more realistic assumption that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some
aggregate liquidity shock. We are trying to capture the idea that individual investors are forced to
sell their investments early particularly at times when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In
those times, some individual investors have deeper pockets than others, and thus are less exposed
to the liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate liquidity shock occurs, some individual investors
will need to sell, but they will get a low price because buyers do not know if they have deep pockets
and sell because of adverse information or because they are truly aﬀected by the aggregate liquidity
crisis.
The main prediction of the extended model is that countries with a high probability of liquidity
problems will be the source of relatively more FPI and less FDI. Another prediction is that the
eﬀect of the expected liquidity shocks on the shares of FDI and FPI is driven by lack of transparency
about the fundamentals of the investment. If the fundamentals were publicly known, then liquidity
shocks would not be that costly for direct investors, as the investors would be able to sell the
investment at fair price without bearing the consequences of the lemons problem. Hence, the
second empirical prediction is that the eﬀect of an expected liquidity shock on the ratio between
FPI and FDI decreases in the level of transparency in the source country.
We take these predictions to the data. A main advantage of the new speciﬁcation of the model
is that it can be taken directly to macro data. We use negative purchase of external assets as
an indicator of aggregate liquidity problems. Our measures of FDI and FPI are based on source
countries’ stocks of external assets as compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Using a sample
of 65 countries between 1985 and 2004, we ﬁrst estimate the determinants of liquidity shortages.
Then, based on the estimated results, we examine the eﬀect of the expected liquidity problems
on the choice of a source country between FDI and FPI. Overall, using various speciﬁcations and
2control variables, we ﬁnd strong support for our model: when more severe liquidity problems are
expected, the ratio between FPI and FDI at the source country increases.
We further introduce proxies for capital market opacity to capture the degree of asymmetric
information in the source country. We interact these opacity measures with the expected liquidity
and conﬁrm that greater capital-market opacity in the source country strengthens the eﬀect of the
expected liquidity problems on the ratio between FPI and FDI. This illustrates that a channel for
strong institutions to aﬀect capital ﬂows is through the mitigation of the consequence of potential
liquidity shocks.3
Our results have strong implications for the future of FDI investments by collective investment
funds. These funds have expanded signiﬁcantly in the past few years due to historically low interest
rates, high liquidity of investors and the good performance of private equity funds. However,
events such as the recent subprime market turbulence and the resulting credit crunch could lead to
diﬃculties for the private equity funds in conducting FDI investments. Our results are also relevant
for the going debate on the transparency requirements for collective investment funds.4 Initiatives
to improve these funds’ transparency may increase funds’ ability to engage in FDI, as they will
then be less likely to suﬀer from the lemons problem during liquidity crises. This can be beneﬁcial
to investment funds, as FDI engagement, in the long run, is likely to generate higher returns than
FPI, due to the management eﬃciency.
Our paper is related to the vast empirical literature on international equity ﬂows. Several
papers study the determinants of FDI (including cross-border M&As) emphasizing factors such as
wealth and credit constraints, governance, mispricing, and ﬁre sales. They include: Froot and Stein
(1991), Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002), Rossi and Volpin (2004), Aguiar and Gopinath (2005),
Albuquerque, Loayza, and Serven (2005), and Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009). Other papers
(e.g., Griﬃn, Nardari, and Stulz, 2004; Gelos and Wei, 2005; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; and Leuz,
Lins, and Warnock, 2009) study the determinants of FPI. Albuquerque (2003) studies the ratio of
FDI to FPI at the level of the host country, emphasizing expropriation risk. None of these papers
examines the eﬀect of potential liquidity crises or considers the determinants of the composition
between FDI and FPI at the level of the source country.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the hypotheses based on
3Earlier works have emphasized the importance of host country institution on capital inﬂow. For instance, Al-
faro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych (2008) document that the low institutional quality, measured by host country’s
political risk, is the leading explanation of the lack of capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries.
4See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aMS8oOJlJp0I&refer=germany
3the model that is contained in the appendix. In Section 3, we describe the data. The econometric
model and its various speciﬁcations are presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the results
of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
2H y p o t h e s e s
Our hypotheses are based on an extension of the model by Goldstein and Razin (2006). The
extension is fully and formally developed in the appendix of this paper. In this section, we provide
a short intuitive description.
Our main hypothesis is that a source country’s composition of foreign equity investment will
have more FPI and less FDI if this country is expected to experience more liquidity problems. The
idea is that direct investments are more costly to liquidate. Hence, expecting greater liquidity needs
in the future, investors tend to tilt their investments towards the liquid asset, which is a portfolio
investment.
This hypothesis does not depend on the source of illiquidity of direct investment. The model of
Goldstein and Razin (2006) and its extension in this paper derive the illiquidity endogenously as a
result of asymmetric information. In the model, foreign direct investors are able to acquire better
information about the fundamentals of the ﬁrms that they hold due to their ownership positions.
This provides an advantage to FDI relative to FPI when it comes to managing the investment.
But, when they need to sell due to a liquidity need, FDI investors face a lemon problem due to
their superior information and sell at a discount. In the extension developed in the appendix, if the
country gets into an aggregate liquidity problem, individual investors might face liquidity needs,
which force them to sell. At this point, holding FDI is disadvantageous, as buyers do not know if
the sale is due to a liquidity need or adverse information. Hence, in countries that expect greater
liquidity problems, investors will choose to conduct more FPI and less FDI.
Our second hypothesis points more directly to the source of illiquidity in the model: asymmetric
information. It says that the link between expected liquidity problems and the ratio of FPI to
FDI is stronger in countries with lower transparency. This is because transparency alleviates the
asymmetric information problem and reduces the cost of holding FDI in times of liquidity shortage.
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Our key variable of interest is the ratio between the assets that a country holds as FPI and the assets
that it holds as FDI. To measure this ratio, we use the recently available data on a country’s external
assets and liabilities, as compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007) assemble a comprehensive dataset on the external assets and liabilities of 140 developed and
developing countries for the period 1970—2004. They distinguish four types of international assets:
foreign direct investment, foreign portfolio (equity) investment, oﬃcial reserves, and external debt.
The convention for distinguishing between direct investment and portfolio investment is to see
whether the ownership of shares of companies is above or below 10%.I fi ti sa b o v et h et h r e s h o l d ,
then it is classiﬁed as direct investment.5
For most countries, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) use as a benchmark the oﬃcial International
Investment Position (IIP) estimates. However, only very few countries have consistently reported
their IIP over the period 1970—2004, with the majority of countries starting to report in the early
1990s. For earlier years, they then work backwards with data on capital ﬂows, together with cal-
culations for capital gains and losses, to generate estimates for stock positions. In their estimation,
due to cross-country variation in the reliability of the data, they also employ a range of valuation
techniques to obtain the most appropriate series for each country. Particularly, they use similar
valuation adjustment for FPI and FDI. In our estimation, we use the data from 1985 till 2004 as
t h es a m p l ep e r i o d .
Our sample includes both developed and developing countries as source countries for outward
FPI and FDI. New sources of FDI are emerging among developing and transition economies, as
multinationals from these economies become major regional - or sometimes even global - players. It
seems that the new global links these multinationals are forging will have far-reaching repercussions
in shaping the world economic landscape of the coming decades (UNCTAD: World Investment
Report 2006). Table 1 lists the countries covered in the sample from 1985 till 2004, and their mean
ratio of FPI to FDI.6
5Arguably, there is the problem of "borderline" cases where it is diﬃcult to classify an investment as FDI or FPI.
In countries where FPI is liberalized, a portfolio investor might buy more than 10 percent of the shares of companies
without having a "lasting interest" to control the companies. And yet that investor’s investment can be classiﬁed as
FDI. Using the control interest as a dividing line, there are circumstances where FDI can turn into FPI through the
dilution of ownership and loss of control. Conversely, FPI can be transformed into FDI, if the investor decides to
have a management interest in the companies whose assets he had earlier purchased as FPI.
6Sample coverage in the following econometric analyses varies a bit, depending on whether countries have data
5Our key explanatory variable measures the extent of liquidity problems in the source country.
As we explain in the next section, we estimate this variable using data on annual ﬂows in external
assets. This data is collected from the IMF’s Balance of Payments dataset.7 Finally, in the following
empirical sections, we will also use a few macroeconomic variables as our explanatory variables.
These macroeconomic data, such as GDP, current account balance, exchange rates, and trade
openness, are collected from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database, which has historical
cross-country coverage. Some other variables, such as political risk and opacity, are collected from
various datasets and will be described in more details when introduced.
4 Econometric Model
We ﬁrst develop a linear model, where liquidation of external assets is a continuous variable,
measuring the severity of the ﬁnancial fragility of the country. We then develop a nonlinear model,
where there is a latent ﬁnancial fragility state, and when it goes above some threshold, there is a
liquidity crisis. Using these two speciﬁcations, we examine how perceived ﬁnancial fragility in the
future aﬀects the FPI/FDI composition.
4.1 Linear Model
The crux of our theory is that if a country expects greater liquidity problems in the future it will
increase the share of FPI relative to FDI. We use the variable  [+1] to proxy for the
severity of expected liquidity shocks, as perceived in period , and investigate how it aﬀects the
FPI/FDI ratio for source countries. The empirical analysis has two stages. First, to estimate the
expected severity of liquidity shocks, we run the following regression:
+1 =  +  + +1 +  + +1 (1)
Then, we use the expected value of +1, estimated from (1), as our main explanatory
variable for the ratio of FPI to FDI in period :
ln() =  +  [+1]+ +  +  (2)
on various explanatory variables. Table 1 is for the sample when countries have data available for the estimations in
Table 3.
7This data does not account for changes in valuation, and therefore allows ud to capture the notion of the quantity
of investment liquidations in our model.
6In (1), +1 is measured as the negative net annual purchase of external assets — which
include FDI, FPI, other investments and foreign reserves — in country  in period +1.W en o r m a l i z e
these ﬂows by the stock of total external assets of country  at time .  are variables that aﬀect
both the liquidity shock and the ratio of FPI to FDI.  are variables excluded from equation (2),
+1 are year ﬁxed eﬀects and  stand for country eﬀects. In (2), we take the log of the FPI/FDI
ratio to reduce the impact of extreme values. In this equation,  stands for time ﬁxed eﬀects, 
stands for country eﬀects.  and +1 are i.i.d. residuals.
Our selection of control variables  is motivated by Faria et al. (2007), who examine the
determinants of the composition of a country’s external liabilities. They consider a set of explana-
tory variables, including country size, economic development level, trade openness and ﬁnancial
reform. They ﬁnd that only country size has some explanatory power on the distribution of equity
liabilities between direct investment and portfolio equity. As little work has empirically examined
the composition of external assets, we use the control variables in Faria et al. (2007) as our starting
point. First, we include two variables — the log of the population and the log of GDP per capita
in constant US dollars — to capture market size and the level of economic development. We then
also include trade openness, as measured by imports plus exports over GDP, to control for the
connection between trade and FDI. We further include the lagged real exchange rate to capture the
wealth eﬀect on capital ﬂows (see Froot and Stein (1991)). Table 2 provides summary statistics of
these variables.
The vector  is motivated by the literature on ﬁnancial crises (e.g., Frankel and Rose, 1996).
It includes source country political risk index, current account surplus over GDP, and a country’s
external debt over total assets. Political risk index, from the International Country Risk Guide,
is based mainly on government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment proﬁle, internal
conﬂict, external conﬂict, corruption, and bureaucracy quality.8 It has been linked to ﬁnancial
crises in earlier literature, with higher political risk making the economy vulnerable to capital ﬂow
reversals (e.g. Gelos and Wei (2005), and Broner, Gelos and Reinhart (2006)). Identifying the
system in (1) and (2) requires the exclusion restriction to be satisﬁed. That is, the variables in
 should have no eﬀect on  except for the indirect eﬀect via the expected liquidity
shock. Indeed, our theory does not suggest the inclusion of political risk, current account surplus,
and external debt as direct controls in (2), and we are not aware of other models that suggest
such a link. In earlier literature, political risk at the host country has been tied to its level of FDI
8See http://www.prsgroup.com/commonhtml/ methods.html# _International_Country_Risk.
7due to conﬁscation considerations (Albuquerque (2003) and Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan and Volosovych
(2008)). The link between FDI and these conﬁscation considerations, however, does not apply to
the source country. Another potential concern is that the current account balance may indirectly
aﬀect the FPI/FDI composition through aﬀecting the exchange rate, which may then generate
some wealth eﬀect and inﬂuence FDI and FPI asymmetrically as in Froot and Stein (1991).9 To
alleviate this concern, we include a control variable for the real exchange rate in equation (2).10
Finally, we consider another speciﬁcation for (2), where the lagged FPI/FDI can aﬀect the
current FPI/FDI. Hence, we estimate:
ln() = ln()−1 +  +  [+1]+ +  +  (3)
There is a complication in estimating equation (3). That is, if  is not i.i.d but serially-correlated,
then ln()−1 will be correlated with  and thus create an endogeneity problem. To
correct this problem, we then use the Arellano-Bond dynamic GMM approach to estimate equation
(3).
4.2 Threshold Model
We now turn to describe the alternative model — the threshold model. The idea here is that a
liquidity shock has a strong impact on the FPI/FDI composition only after it reaches a certain






1 if +1  0
0 if +1 ≤ 0
 (4)
where +1is a function of independent variables as speciﬁed in equation (1). Here, we
deﬁne a liquidity crisis as an episode of negative purchase of external assets, which has a frequency
9The Froot and Stein (1991) model operates via a wealth eﬀect in the host country. Because of frictions in control
that exist in FDI but not in FPI, wealth is important only for FDI. Thus a rise in host-country wealth, from the
appreciation of its real exchange rate, will increase its FDI inﬂow, while having no impact on its FPI receipts. One
could potentially extend their model to source countries with the prediction that real exchange rate appreciation may
increase FDI outﬂow, relative to FPI outﬂow.
10Baker, Foley, and Wurgler (2009) also argue that higher source country’s wealth could signiﬁcantly boost FDI
outﬂow, due to cheap ﬁnancial capital. They use the market to book ratio in the US stock market as a proxy of
cheap capital for US ﬁrms. As the data on exchange rate has more country coverage than the market/book ratio, we
will then use the real exchange rate also to proxy for the wealth of source country.
8of 13% in our sample. Table 8 lists the countries and years when there is a liquidity crisis, according
to this deﬁnition. It shows that besides developing countries, some developed economies, such as
Denmark, Japan, New Zealand and Spain, also experienced liquidity crises in our sample period.
After estimating the probability of a liquidity crisis, we use it as an explanatory variable in the
second-stage equation:
ln() =  +  Pr ( +1)+ +  +  (5)
5 Empirical Findings
5.1 Linear Model
5.1.1 Determinants of Liquidity Shocks
Table 3 presents the results of the ﬁrst stage of the estimation, where we examine the determinants
of liquidity shocks. In Columns 1-2, we analyze the determinants of liquidity shocks in the next
year. We report the random-eﬀect estimations. Random-eﬀect estimation diﬀers from ﬁxed-eﬀect
estimation in the treatment of the country eﬀects  in equation (1). In ﬁxed-eﬀect models,  is
treated as a set of ﬁxed parameters, which may either be estimated directly or conditioned out of
the estimation process. In random-eﬀect models,  is a random variable with a speciﬁed probability
distribution (usually i.i.d. normal). The random-eﬀect model would be more eﬃcient (in terms of
smaller standard errors for estimated coeﬃcients of the covariates  and )i f and  are not
correlated with . To test the validity of the assumption of random eﬀects, we apply the Hausman
speciﬁcation test to examine whether the covariates are correlated with  (see Greene (2002)).
In Columns 1 and 2, higher current account surplus signiﬁcantly reduces the severity of liquidity
shocks. Moreover, higher stock of foreign debt over GDP and lower political stability increase the
severity of liquidity shocks. A Hausman test reports a 2 of 2976, which then produces a p-value
of 023 with a distribution of 2(25). The test can hence be interpreted as supporting the validity
of the random-eﬀect estimation. When we move on to the second stage of the estimation, we will
thus use the results from Column 2 (random eﬀect model with more  variables) to capture the
expected severity of a liquidity shock.
In the above analysis we estimate the determinants of liquidity shocks in the following year.
We then use the estimated expected liquidity shock in the next section to explain the choice
between FDI and FPI. A potential weakness in this speciﬁcation is that the choice of investment
9composition eﬀectively occurs at a lower frequency, and thus when this choice is made it is aﬀected
by the expected liquidity problems in the next few years. We address this issue in Columns 3-4.
Here, on the left-hand side of the regression, we have the maximum severity of a liquidity shock in
the next three years, i.e., (+1+2+3). The idea is that investors
try to estimate the worst liquidity problem in the next three years and use this to guide their
choice between FDI and FPI. The determinants of liquidity shocks in the next three years are
overall consistent with those in Columns 1-2, albeit with lower signiﬁcance. Again, the results of
a Hausman test suggest that the random-eﬀect model is more eﬃcient than the ﬁxed-eﬀect model
(2 =2 76, producing a p-value of 100 with a 2(25) distribution).
5.1.2 The Choice between FPI and FDI
With the predicted severity of liquidity shocks from Column 2 of Table 3, we can now estimate
equations (2) and (3). The second-stage regression results are presented in Table 4, with all standard
errors clustered at the country level. Column 1 presents the random-eﬀect estimation with no
dynamic feedbacks. As the theory predicts, more severe liquidity shocks in the future increase the
share of FPI outﬂow relative to FDI outﬂow. The eﬀect also seems to be economically signiﬁcant.
From Table 2, we know that the percentage change of FPI over FDI is 3% on average per year with
a standard deviation of 49% (see second row of the table). Meanwhile, the change of the predicted
severity of liquidity shock is -0.01 per year on average, with a standard deviation of 0.02. If the
predicted severity of liquidity shock increases by one standard deviation, this will be translated
into a percentage change of FPI/FDI by 14% (=6.93*0.02), based on the estimations in Table 4.
This is about 30% of the standard deviation of the annual percentage change of FPI/FDI (i.e.,
30%=14%/49%). Again, we run a Hausman test to examine whether the random eﬀect model
estimates the data more eﬃciently. The Hausman test generates a 2(23) of 2362 and a p-value
of 043. That is, the random eﬀect estimation is valid and more eﬃcient.
Column 2 reports the dynamic panel estimation. The dynamic estimation reduces the sample
size, but reassuringly, more severe liquidity shocks in the future still increase FPI relative to FDI.
We also ﬁnd that the lagged FPI/FDI ratio is associated with the current FPI/FDI ratio. The
coeﬃcient of the lagged FPI/FDI is 0.73, suggesting that there is no panel unit root process for
().
The year-to-year variation in the FPI/FDI ratio could be noisy, we hence look at longer intervals
of years as a noise reduction method. We study a three-year interval from 1986 to 2004, by looking
10at the change of FPI/FDI ratio across 1986, 1989,..., 2004 (Column 3). The predicted severity
of liquidity shock is from Column 4 of Table 3, which forecasts the maximum severity of liquidity
shock in the coming three years for a given time . This reduces the sample size signiﬁcantly. Again,
the eﬀect of liquidity shock on FPI/FDI composition is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Moreover, the
eﬀect of liquidity shock in the three-year interval (Column 3) is almost twice as large as that in the
one-year interval (Column 1). Hence taking longer intervals indeed reduces the noise in the data.
As a robustness check, we consider several variations of equation (2) in Table 5. Following
the intuition presented above — that investment decisions are made on a low-frequency basis — we
examine the results at a 4-year and 5-year interval in Columns 1 and 2 of the table. The impact
of the predicted severity on the ratio of FPI to FDI turns out to be large and signiﬁcant at those
intervals. Sticking with the 5-year interval, we then add more variables to equation (2) to tackle the
problem of potential omitted variables. We ﬁrst add the Chinn and Ito (2008) measure of capital
account openness, which is the principal component from a set of binary dummy variables that
codify restrictions on cross-border ﬁnancial transactions as reported in the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant eﬀect for it
on either the liquidity problems or the FPI/FDI composition (Column 3 of Table 5). Then, we
add the two-year lag of stock market capitalization over GDP to capture the development level
of stock market.11 On the one hand, a more developed stock market may have more established
professional asset management (mutual funds and hedge funds, for instance), which could help
domestic investors to enter international stock markets and therefore increase FPI outﬂow. But
on the other hand, a more developed domestic stock market may provide more opportunities at
home and hence reduce the incentive for portfolio investors to go abroad. It is then an empirical
question which eﬀect dominates. We do not ﬁnd it to have any signiﬁcant impact on equity ﬂow
composition. More importantly, it does not alter our earlier result on the eﬀect of expected liquidity
problems (Column 4 of Table 5) . We also use an alternative measure of stock market depth, i.e.,
the number of listed domestic stocks. Again, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results for it (Column 5 of
Table 5).
Overall, the above results point to an eﬀect of expected future liquidity problems on the com-
position of foreign equity investments. Consistent with our theory, countries that expect higher
liquidity problems are more likely to choose FPI over FDI as a vehicle of investment in foreign coun-
11One may argue that stock market capitalization can be aﬀected by stock return and might be endogenous. Hence,
we take the two-year lag to reduce potential endogeneity.
11tries. While our theory is based on information asymmetries, these results could also be consistent
with a simple story of transaction costs or market depth that cause FPI to be easier to liquidate
than FDI. For example, to liquidate FDI, it may take longer to ﬁnd buyers who know the sector
and are willing to take over the management. But to liquidate FPI, it will not be diﬃcult to sell
stocks to other portfolio investors in a deep stock market. If an investor foresees a liquidity crisis
and the need to liquidate assets, he may then choose FPI instead. To provide further support for
the story of information asymmetry, we now present evidence on the interaction between liquidity
and capital-market transparency and how it inﬂuences the FPI/FDI composition.
5.2 Capital Market Opacity in Source Country
A key prediction of the theoretical model is that the more opaque the source country is, the higher is
the impact of the predicted liquidity shocks on FPI/FDI. Hence, we estimate the following equation
ln() =  +  [+1]+ [+1] ∗  +  +  +  (6)
We expect to see a positive value of . Note that the opacity index itself is excluded as an
explanatory variable, as it is time-invariant and therefore imbedded in country eﬀects.
In the theoretical model, opacity can be about the fundamentals of the project or the liquidity
situation of investors. We now use proxies that capture the degree of opacity about investors’
liquidity, and to some extent, the underlying projects. We will introduce several proxies of capital
market opacity to capture the degree of asymmetric information in the country.
We start with the Opacity Factor index constructed by the Kurtzman Group and published in
MIT Sloan Management Review (2004), which follows the methodology in the original opacity index
by Pricewaterhouse-Cooper (2001) but expands the country coverage from 35 to 48. The original
2001 opacity index has been applied in Gelos and Wei (2005), where they look at the connection
between transparency and international investor behavior. The Opacity Factor index measures
opacity based on some standards-related dimensions. It includes ﬁve dimensions– corruption,
eﬃcacy of the legal system, deleterious economic policy, inadequate accounting and governance
practices, and detrimental regulatory structures.12 Table 6 lists the Opacity Factor index (OPA),
where a higher value indicates higher level of opacity. The regression results for the overall opacity
index (OPA) are presented in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 7. Column 1, for the random eﬀect model,
12See: http://www.opacityindex.com/opacity_index.pdf
12shows that the more opaque a country’s capital market is, the higher the eﬀect of the predicted
liquidity shock on the country’s FPI/FDI composition. Column 2 reports the dynamic estimation.
Reassuringly, the interaction term of opacity and the expected liquidity problems is still signiﬁcantly
positive. Consistent with our expectation, in both cases, higher opacity increases the eﬀect of the
predicted liquidity crisis. 13
We then use another indicator of capital market transparency: the disclosure score from Center
for International Financial Analysis and Research (1995), which examines ﬁrm-level annual reports
for the omission or inclusion of 90 accounting items in 41 countries for the year of 1993. The
score is related to ﬁrm’s incomes, cash ﬂows and balance sheets, which cover ﬁrm’s liquidity and
operations. It ranges from 56 to 85, with higher score associated with better corporate disclosure. It
has been applied in prior studies (La Porta et al. (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), and Bushman,
Piotroski and Smith (2004)). We use 100 minus the original CIFAR transparency index to arrive
at the CIFAR opacity index (Table 6). CIFAR score is highly correlated with the earlier Opacity
Factor index (correlation=0.63) . The correlations are reasonably high, considering that both the
methodologies and the base years are diﬀerent (year 1993 vs. 2004). Note that the CIFAR score
has 10% fewer country coverages compared with the earlier Opacity Factor index. With the CIFAR
score, we again ﬁnd that higher opacity increases the eﬀect of liquidity shock, albeit insigniﬁcantly
(Columns 3 and 4 of Table 7).
Columns 5 and 6 apply another proxy of opacity from the Global Competitiveness Report
(1999) by the World Economic Forum. The Report includes results from surveys about the level
of ﬁnancial disclosure about companies, which measure the perceptions of over 3,000 executives
about the country in which they operate and covers 53 countries. The respondents were asked
to assess the validity of the statement “The level of ﬁnancial disclosure required is extensive and
detailed” with a score from 1 (strongly disagree)t o7( s t r o n g l ya g r e e ) .W eu s e8m i n u st h eo r i g i n a l
value to construct our proxy of opacity (WEF, see Table 6). This proxy for corporate opacity has
previously been applied in Gelos and Wei (2005). It is highly correlated with our other proxies. The
correlation is 0.78 and 0.65 with OPA and CIFAR, respectively. The regression results in Columns
5 and 6 of Table 7 again suggest that opacity signiﬁcantly strengthens the impact of the liquidity
shock on the FPI/FDI composition.
In Columns 7 to 9, we estimate the impact of opacity and liquidity shock on FPI/FDI for
13Our sample size in Table 5 is around 70% of that in Table 4, as some source countries are not covered by the
Opacity Index.
13every three years from 1986 to 2004. The predicted severity of liquidity shock is based on Col-
umn 4 of Table 3, which forecasts the maximum severity of liquidity shock in the coming three
years. The interaction of liquidity shock with opacity is signiﬁcant across the three indicators of
opacity. Moreover, the coeﬃcients are much larger than their counterparts in the one-year-interval
estimation.
The ﬁndings in Table 7 thus provide strong support of our asymmetric-information-based theo-
r e t i c a lm od e l .T obem o r ep r e c i s e ,w ec a n n o tr u l eo u tthe potential existence of the pure-transaction-
cost-based liquidity eﬀect as mentioned in the last section. But based on Table 7, we can say that
asymmetric information is an important driving force behind the eﬀect of the liquidity pressure on
equity outﬂow composition.
5.3 Threshold Model
We now turn to an alternative model based on a threshold eﬀect. Following the speciﬁcation in
(4), we estimate the probability that a country will get into a liquidity crisis, where a crisis is
deﬁned as a negative purchase of external assets in a certain year. We then estimate the eﬀect of
the probability of a crisis on the FPI/FDI composition.
Table 8 lists the crisis years for countries in the sample. We can see that crises episodes
are widespread across countries and over time. Importantly, even some developed economies like
Denmark, Greece, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, and Spain, experienced liquidity crises during our
sample period according to our deﬁnition.
The results of the ﬁrst-stage estimation (Equation (4)) are presented in Table 9. The ﬁrst
column estimates the determinants of the probability of a crisis in the next year. Higher political
risk, higher foreign debt over GDP, smaller GDP and smaller current account surplus increase the
probability of crises. In Column 2, we estimate the probability of a crisis in the coming three years
(i.e., the probability that there will be a net sale of assets in one of the next three years). We ﬁnd
that variables that are signiﬁcant in Column 1 are still signiﬁcant in Column 2.
With the predicted probability of a crisis for the coming year (from Column 1 of Table 9), we
then estimate its role in aﬀecting the FPI/FDI composition. Table 10 presents the results of the
estimation with country random eﬀects (Column 1) and with dynamic eﬀects (Column 2). We ﬁnd
that the eﬀect of crisis probability is signiﬁcantly positive in both speciﬁcations. We then estimate
the FPI/FDI ratio every three years, every four years and every ﬁve years, in Column 3, 4, and 5,
respectively. We again ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient for the crisis probability.
14In Table 11, we use the predicted probability of a crisis in the coming three years (from Column 2
of Table 9), and repeat the analysis of Table 10. We still ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive coeﬃcient for
the eﬀect of the probability of crisis in the coming three years on the FPI/FDI ratio. Interestingly,
the results in Table 11 are overall stronger (both statistically and economically).
Overall, the eﬀect of expected liquidity shocks on the choice between FDI and FPI appears
to be strong and consistent with our theory under the alternative speciﬁcation, where there is a
threshold eﬀect, such that investors consider the probability of getting into a liquidity crisis when
deciding on the type of investment.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we examine how the fear of liquidity shocks guides international investors in choosing
between FPI and FDI. Our hypothesis is based on an extension of Goldstein and Razin (2006).
In the original model, FDI investors control the management of the ﬁrms; whereas FPI investors
delegate decisions to managers. Consequently, direct investors are more informed than portfolio
investors about the prospects of projects. This information enables them to manage their projects
more eﬃciently. However, if investors need to sell their investments before maturity because of
liquidity shocks, the price they can get will be lower when buyers know that they have more
information on investment projects. We extend the Goldstein and Razin (2006) model by making
the assumption that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some aggregate liquidity
shock. A key prediction then is that countries that expect an aggregate liquidity problem will be
the source of more FPI and less FDI. Another prediction is that this eﬀect will be strong only when
the transparency in the source country is weak.
To test this hypothesis, we apply a dynamic panel model to examine the variation of FPI
relative to FDI for source countries from 1985 to 2004. We use the net sale of external assets
as a proxy for liquidity problems. We estimate the determinants of liquidity problems, and then
test the eﬀect of expected liquidity problems on the ratio between FPI and FDI generated by the
source country. We ﬁnd strong support for our model: greater expected liquidity problems have
as i g n i ﬁcant positive eﬀect on the ratio between FPI and FDI. Moreover, higher opacity in the
source country accelerates this eﬀect. Hence, liquidity shocks seem to have strong eﬀects on the
composition of foreign investment, as predicted by our model.
15Appendix
We develop a model that generates the empirical predictions tested in the paper. The model is
an extension of the model in Goldstein and Razin (2006).
Liquidity shocks and the choice between FDI and FPI
A small economy is faced by a continuum [01] of foreign investors. Each foreign investor has
an opportunity to invest in one investment project. Foreign investment can occur in one of two
forms: either as a direct investment (FDI) or as a portfolio investment (FPI). A direct investor
eﬀectively acts like a manager, whereas in case of a portfolio investment, the project is managed by
an "outsider". Investors are risk neutral, and thus choose the form of investment that maximizes
(ex-ante) expected payoﬀ.
There are three periods of time: 0, 1,a n d2.I np e r i o d0, each investor decides whether to make
a direct investment or a portfolio investment. In period 2, the project matures. The net cash ﬂow





where  is an idiosyncratic random productivity factor, which is independently realized for each
project in period 1,a n d is the level of capital input invested in the project in period 1, after
the realization of . The productivity shock  is distributed between −1 and 1 with mean 0.T h e
cumulative distribution function is (·), and the density function is (·)=0(·). The parameter 
reﬂects production costs.
In period 1, after the realization of the productivity shock, the manager of the project observes
. Thus, if the investor owns the project as a direct investment, she observes ,a n dc h o o s e s,s o













In case of a portfolio investment, the owner is at arms length relationships with the manager,
and thus she cannot observe . In this case, the manager follows earlier instructions as for the level
of . Following the logic described in Goldstein and Razin (2006), we assume that the ex-ante
16instruction is chosen by the owner so as to maximize the expected return absent any information
on the realization of , and is based on the ex-ante 0 mean. Thus, the manager will be instructed
to choose  = (0) = 1





Comparing (9) with (10), we see that if the project is held until maturity, it yields a higher
payoﬀ as a direct investment than as a portfolio investment. This reﬂects the eﬃciency that results
from a hands-on management style in the case of a direct investment. There are also costs for
FDI investment, however. First, an FDI investor has to incur a ﬁxed cost in order to acquire the
expertise to manage the project directly. We denote this cost, which is exogenously given in the
model, by . Second, there is an endogenous cost arising from the possibility of liquidity shocks
occurring in period 1. Speciﬁcally, in period 1,b e f o r et h ev a l u eo f is observed, the owner of the
project might get a liquidity shock. With the realization of a liquidity shock, the investor is forced
to sell the project immediately. Then, as demonstrated below, due to information asymmetries,
there will be a discount when selling a project managed as direct investment.
In specifying the probability of a liquidity shock, we deviate from Goldstein and Razin (2006)
by assuming that liquidity shocks to individual investors are triggered by some aggregate liquidity
shock. Speciﬁcally, there is a probability  of an aggregate liquidity shock in period 1.O n c e
the shock occurs, it becomes common knowledge. Conditional on the realization of the aggregate
liquidity shock, individual investors may be subject to a need to sell their investment at period 1.
In particular, half of the investorsw i l ln e e dt os e l lw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y and half with probability .
We follow Goldstein and Razin (2006) and assume that 1    1
2    0,a n d +  =1 .
Investors know ex ante whether they are of a  type or a  type and this is their private
information. With probability (1 − ), an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur. In this case
individual investors never have a liquidity need that forces them to sell at period 1.
This speciﬁcation of the model is admittedly simple. The idea that we are trying to capture
with this speciﬁcation is that individual investors are forced to sell their investments early at times
when there are aggregate liquidity problems. In those times, some individual investors have deeper
pockets than others, and thus are less exposed to the liquidity issues. Thus, once an aggregate
liquidity shock occurs,  investors, who have deeper pockets, are less likely to need to sell than
 investors.
17In addition to liquidity-based sales, there is a possibility that an investor will liquidate a project
in period 1 if she observes a low realization of . If an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur,
then it is known that no investor needs to sell in period 1 due to liquidity needs. This implies
that the only reason to sell at that time is adverse information on the proﬁtability of the project.
As a result, the market breaks down due to the well-known lemons problem (see Akerlof (1970)).
Thus, when an aggregate liquidity shock does not occur, no investor sells her investment at period
1. Investors wait till the maturity of the investment, and get
((1+)2)
2 in case they hold a FDI
(see (9)) and 1
2 in case they hold a FPI (see (10)). On the other hand, if a liquidity shock does
happen, direct investors may sell due to a low realization of . Then, using Bayes’ Law, the price













Here,  is a threshold level of , set by the direct investor; below which the direct investor
is selling the project without being forced to do so by a liquidity shock;  is the probability, as
perceived by the market, that an FDI investor gets a liquidity shock. In (11), it is assumed that if
the project is sold due to a liquidity shock, that is, before the initial owner observes ,t h ev a l u e
of  is not recorded in the ﬁrms before the sale. Therefore, the buyer does not know the value of
. However, if the project is sold for low-proﬁtability reasons, the owner will know the value of 
after the sale.
Of course, the threshold  is determined in equilibrium. The initial owner sets the threshold
level , such that given 1, when observing , she is indiﬀerent between selling and not selling






Equations (11) and (12) together determine 1 and  as functions of the market-perceived
probability . We denote these functions as: () and 1().
Because portfolio investors do not observe  in period 1, they only sell their investment project
at that time if they are forced to do so. The period-1 price of a portfolio investment is then easier
to determine. Essentially, when a portfolio investor sells the projects in period 1,e v e r y b o d yk n o w s





18Comparing the price of FDI, which is determined by (11) and (12), with the price of FPI, which
is determined by (13), we see that the resale price of a direct investment in period 1 is always lower
than the resale price of a portfolio investment in that period. The intuition is that if a direct investor
prematurely sells the investment project, the market price must reﬂect the possibility that the sale
originates from inside information on low prospects of this investment project. This constitutes the
second cost of FDI.
Based on this analysis, we can write the ex-ante expected net cash ﬂow from FDI:





































Then, the diﬀerence between the expected value of FDI and the expected value of FPI is:
 ( ) ≡ ( ) − () (16)
Clearly, investor  will choose FDI when  ( )  0;w i l lc h o o s eF P Iw h e n ( ) 
0; and will be indiﬀerent between the two (that is, may choose either FDI or FPI) when  ( )=
0.
To complete the description of equilibrium, it remains to specify how , the market perceived
probability that an FDI investor will get a liquidity shock, is determined. Assuming that rational
expectations hold in equilibrium,  has to be consistent with the equilibrium choice of the two





where  is the proportion of  investors who choose FDI in equilibrium and  is the
proportion of  investors who choose FDI in equilibrium.
The analysis of equilibrium outcomes is very similar to that in Goldstein and Razin (2006).










Case 1, 2, 3
* A
 A H




Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcomes
to show that the equilibrium outcomes characterized in Proposition 3 of their paper hold here for
any value of  between 0 and 1.14 These outcomes are summarized in the following ﬁgure:
The ﬁve cases referred to in the ﬁgure are as follows: Case 1: All investors choose FDI. Case
2:  investors choose FDI;  investors split between FDI and FPI. Case 3:  investors choose
FDI;  investors choose FPI. Case 4:  investors split between FDI and FPI;  investors
choose FPI. Case 5: All investors choose FPI.




— depend on the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock , and leads to our empirical prediction.
In particular, ∗, ∗
(),a n d∗∗
() are decreasing in ,w h i l e∗∗∗
 () is increasing in .15 This
implies that as the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock  increases, there will be more FPI
14Details are available from the authors upon request.
15This is based on a straightforward analysis of the eﬀect of  on the function .N o t et h a t does not have
an unambiguous eﬀect on .T h ee ﬀect depends on the relation between  and . The result comes from the





 (),a n d
∗∗∗
 () are all derived
for situations where  ≥ . More details are available from the authors upon request.
20and less FDI in equilibrium. Thus, the ratio of FPI to FDI will increase. The intuition is that as
the probability of an aggregate liquidity shock increases, agents know that they are more likely to
need to sell the investment early, in which case they will get a low price since buyers do not know
whether they sell because of an individual liquidity need or because of adverse information on the
productivity of the investment. As a result, the attractiveness of FDI decreases. The empirical
prediction is that countries with a higher tendency for liquidity problems will be source of a higher
ratio of FPI to FDI.
T h eR o l eo fO p a c i t y
The eﬀect of liquidity shocks on the composition of foreign investment between FDI and FPI is
driven by lack of transparency about the fundamentals of the direct investment or liquidity situation
of the ﬁrms. If the fundamentals or liquidity situation were publicly known, then liquidity shocks
would not be that costly for direct investors, as the investors would be able to sell the investment
at fair price without bearing the consequences of the lemons problem.
More precisely, suppose that the source country imposes disclosure rules on its investors that
ensure the truthful revelation of investment fundamentals to the public. In such a case, FDI
investors will have to reveal the realization of  once it becomes known to them. Then, since
potential buyers know the true value of the investment, direct investors will be able to sell their
investment at
(1+)2
2 . Thus, whether or not a direct investor sells the investment, he is able to extract
the value
(1+)2
2 , and so the expected value from investing in FDI is
((1+)2)
2 − . The expected
value from investing in FPI is 1
2 as before. This is because the kind of disclosure requirements
we describe here do not aﬀect the value of portfolio investments. These are requirements that are
imposed by the source country, and thus apply only for investments that are being controlled by
source-country investors.16
Analyzing the trade oﬀ between FDI and FPI under this perfect source-country transparency,
we can see two things. First, with transparency, FDI becomes more attractive than before. Second,
with transparency, the decision between FDI and FPI ceases to be a function of the probability of
a liquidity shock. This leads to our second empirical prediction: the eﬀect of an expected liquidity
shock on the ratio of FPI and FDI increases in the level of opacity in the source country.
16Note that this type of transparency is diﬀerent from the one studied in Goldstein and Razin (2006). In that
paper the transparency was based on host-country rules, and thus aﬀected the information investors could learn on
their portfolio investments.
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Algeria 4  0.002  Korea 18  0.10 
Argentina 20  2.11  Luxembourg  1  0.66 
Armenia 5  0.55  Malaysia  20  0.13 
Australia  20 0.48  Malta  10 0.43 
Austria 20  0.78  Morocco  2  0.11 
Bahrain  19 1.78  Netherlands 20 0.49 
Belgium 1  0.47  New  Zealand  16  0.54 
Brazil  20 0.05  Norway  20 0.43 
Bulgaria  8 1.07  Pakistan  2 0.07 
Canada  20 0.96  Paraguay  20 0.05 
Chile  20 2.64  Peru  20 2.66 
China,P.R.:  Main  16 0.07  Philippines  20 0.98 
Colombia 20  0.50  Poland  6  0.17 
Costa Rica  9  0.86  Portugal  20  1.42 
Croatia  5 0.05  Romania  7 0.06 
Cyprus  1 2.47  Russia  9 0.02 
Czech Republic  10  1.63  Saudi Arabia  12  0.42 
Denmark 20  0.48  Slovak  Republic  7  4.01 
Dominican Republ  8  1.61  South Africa  20  0.53 
Finland  20 0.14  Spain  20 0.29 
France  20 0.24  Sweden  20 0.26 
Gabon 6  0.14  Switzerland  20  0.90 
Germany  13 0.82  Thailand  18 0.21 
Hong Kong S.A.R.  5  0.30  Togo  16  0.41 
Hungary  13  0.16  Trinidad and Tob  9  0.29 
Iceland  13 1.42  Tunisia  20 9.43 
India  19 0.70  Turkey  16 4.33 
Indonesia  3 0.01  Uganda  1 0.03 
Ireland 20  2.69  Ukraine  5  0.78 
Israel  20 1.04  United  Kingdom  20 0.90 
Italy  20 0.63  United  States  20 0.45 
Japan  20 0.51  Uruguay  16 0.82 
Korea  18 0.10  Venezuela,  Rep.  20 0.64 
 
Note: Table 1 presents the average of FPI stock over FDI stock for 65 source countries over the period 
from 1985 to 2004. Obs is the number of non-missing observations for each source country. Source: Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). 
  




Table 2. Summary statistics of Variables 
 
Variables  Obs  mean  median  st  dev  Min  max 
ln(FPI/FDI)  909  -0.93 -0.71 1.54  -7.56 2.79 
ln(FPI/FDI)-annual  change  878  0.03 0.04 0.49 -3.01  4.43 
FPI/FDI  909  1.03 0.49 1.84 0.00 16.34 
FPI/FDI-annual change  903  -0.04  0.01 1.45 -35.65  8.76 
Expected Severity of liquidity shock  909  -0.03 -0.04 0.05  -0.17 0.19 
Expected  Severity of liquidity shock--
annual  change    834  -0.01 -0.01 0.02  -0.12 0.04 
Current  Account  Balance/GDP  909  -0.81 -1.18 4.87  -17.40  20.30 
Political  stability  909  72.14 74.00 13.72 33.00 97.00 
GDP,  log  909  16.68 16.67 1.64  12.46 20.98 
GDP  per  capita,  log  909  8.76 9.00 1.28 5.31 10.75 
Trade  openness  909  4.09 4.15 0.58 2.51 5.83 
Real  exchange  rate  909  4.62 4.62 0.20 3.78 5.87 
External debt/GDP (%)  909  84.69  55.66  141.19  7.48  995 




Table 3: First stage estimation of the severity of liquidity shock 
  Severity of Liquid Shock 
for Next Year 
Severity of Liquid Shock 
for Coming Three Years 
   Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4 
Current Account Balance/GDP  -0.00322*** -0.00316***  -0.00191**  -0.00186* 
 [0.000849]  [0.000872]  [0.000955]  [0.000967] 
Political stability  -0.00129***  -0.000982**  -0.00108  -0.000744 
 [0.000452]  [0.000436]  [0.000672]  [0.000629] 
GDP, log  0.00737  0.00967  0.000233  0.00419 
 [0.00611]  [0.00595]  [0.00773]  [0.00721] 
GDP per capita, log  0.0218***  0.0174**  0.00504  -0.000848 
 [0.00764]  [0.00747]  [0.00844]  [0.00812] 
Trade openness  -0.00909  -0.0174  -0.00849  -0.0202 
 [0.0143]  [0.0143]  [0.0198]  [0.0208] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  0.0487  0.0455  0.0539  0.0493 
 [0.0331]  [0.0328]  [0.0445]  [0.0442] 
External debt/GDP    0.000139***    0.000214*** 
   [2.18e-05]    [3.44e-05] 
Observations 909  909  909  909 
Within R-squared  0.08  0.08  0.14  0.16 
Number of countries  65  65  65  65 
Note: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is the severity of liquidity shock, defined as the annual 
sale of external assets normalized by the stock of total external assets of that country. The dependent 
variable in Columns 3 and 8 is the maximum of the severity of liquidity shock in the coming three years. 
All estimations include year fixed-effects. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within cluster 
correlation clustered at the country level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 




Table 4. The Impact of Liquidity on FPI/FDI 
 
  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3 
  Random Effects  Dynamic  Three Year Interval 
      
Predicted severity of  
liquidity shock 
6.929* 0.493**  11.89** 
 [4.11]  [0.23]  [4.942] 
GDP, log  -0.322**  -1.632**  -0.223* 
 [0.14]  [0.64]  [0.128] 
GDP per capita, log  0.114  -0.593*  0.169 
 [0.20]  [0.31]  [0.135] 
Trade openness  -0.286  -0.0284  -0.173 
 [0.46]  [0.17]  [0.443] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  -0.962*  -0.264  -1.601** 
 [0.51]  [0.21]  [0.662] 
Lagged FPI/FDI effect    0.728***   
   [0.046]   
Observations 909  846  270 
Within R-squared  0.08    0.08 
Number of countries  65  59  59 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of FPI stock over FDI stock. The estimation in Columns 1 and 
2 is on an annual basis, while in Column 3 it is on a three-year basis. The predicted severity of 
liquidity shock in Column 1 and Column 2 is based on the estimation from Column 2 of Table 3.  The 
predicted severity of liquidity shock in Column 3 is based on the estimation from Column 4 of Table 
3. All estimations include year fixed-effects. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within 
cluster correlation clustered at the country level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less 





Table 5. The Impact of Liquidity on FPI/FDI (Longer Intervals) 
 
    Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5 










          
Predicted severity of liquidity shock    15.28*** 14.12*** 15.74*** 13.37**  11.70* 
    [4.230] [5.439] [5.413] [6.246]  [6.779] 
GDP, log    -0.243*  -0.285* -0.275* -0.392***  -0.25 
    [0.142] [0.164] [0.164] [0.152]  [0.179] 
GDP per capita, log    0.0486  -0.0856  -0.0437  -0.229  -0.113 
    [0.161] [0.200] [0.232] [0.185]  [0.173] 
Trade openness    -0.0163  -0.0815 -0.0369 -0.199  -0.146 
    [0.421] [0.480] [0.488] [0.502]  [0.506] 
Real exchange rate (lag)    -1.393**  -1.179  -1.167  -1.241  -1.729* 
    [0.706] [0.761] [0.811] [0.811]  [0.925] 
Capital openness        -0.0523     
       [0.106]     
Market Capitalization / GDP          0.0705   
       [0.260]   
Number of listed stocks            -0.103 
         [0.161] 
Within  R-squared    0.11 0.18 0.19 0.17  0.23 
Observations    220 170 164 134  129 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of FPI stock over FDI stock. The predicted severity of liquidity shock is based on Column 2 
of Table 3. Column 1 estimates the sample every four years from 1984 to 2004, and Column 2 estimates the sample every five 
years. Columns 3 to 5 also estimate the sample every five years, but add additional explanatory variables. All estimations are based 
on random effect models. All estimations include year fixed-effects. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within cluster 
correlation clustered at the country level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 




Table 6: Opacity Index 
Country CIFAR Opacity Factor WEF 
Argentina   32 44 2.91 
Australia   20 21 1.82 
Austria   38 23 2.06 
Brazil   44 40 2.91 
Bulgaria   3.51 
Canada   25 23 1.84 
Chile   22 29 1.99 
China,P.R.: Mainland 50 4.29 
Colombia   42 43 3.15 
Costa Rica   3.46 
Czech Republic   41 3.71 
Denmark   25 19 2
Egypt   48 3.35 
Finland   17 13 1.58 
France   22 37 2.26 
Germany   33 25 2.39 
Greece   39 41 2.85 
Hungary   36 3.05 
Iceland   2.85 
India   39 48 3.07 
Ireland   19 26 2.62 
Israel   26 30 2.58 
Italy   34 43 2.83 
Japan   29 28 2.75 
Jordan   2.84 
Kong S.A.R. of China  27 20 2.81 
Korea   32 37 3.27 
Malaysia   21 35 2.79 
Mauritius   2.89 
Mexico   29 44 2.66 
Netherlands   26 24 2.2 
New Zealand   20 1.88 
Norway   25 2.04 
Peru   2.97 
Philippines   36 50 3.17 
Poland   41 2.8 
Portugal   44 35 2.67 
Russia   46 4.41 
Saudi Arabia   46
Singapore   21 24 2.37 
Slovak Republic   4.12 
South Africa   21 34 2.48 
Spain   28 34 2.23 
Sweden   17 19 1.69 
Switzerland   20 23 2.65 
Thailand   34 35 3.35 
Turkey   42 43 2.97 
Ukraine   2.22 
United Kingdom   15 19 1.74 
United States   24 21 1.59 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  51 3.88 
Note:  CIFAR is from the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (1995). OPA is from 
MIT Sloan Management Review (2004); WEF is from the Global Competitiveness Report (1999) by the 




Table 7. The Effect of Opacity 
 




















 of liquidity shock 
-5.653 -2.627 5.211 -5.105***  -11.17 -4.390*  -12.52  -12.55  -13.8 
 [9.14]  [1.86]  [9.95]  [1.72]  [10.1] [2.63] [18.84]  [14.84] [18.62] 
Predicted severity of shock   0.367** 0.0839*         0.855**     
  *Opacity (Opacity Factor)  [0.16]  [0.047]          [0.335]     
Predicted severity of shock    0.103  0.0868        1.153*   
  *Opacity (CIFAR)      [0.21]  [0.055]        [0.617]   
Predicted severity of shock         7.013***  1.770**      11.11* 
  *Opacity (WEF)          [2.58]  [0.87]      [5.716] 
GDP, log  -0.761***  -0.433  -0.981***  0.0601  -0.632*** -1.019*** -0.462** -0.601***  -0.523*** 
 [0.28]  [0.32]  [0.27]  [0.27]  [0.18] [0.38] [0.235]  [0.232] [0.157] 
GDP per capita, log  -0.344  -0.490***  -0.739**  -0.0987 -0.444* -0.514***  -0.254 -0.111  -0.121 
 [0.33]  [0.13]  [0.31]  [0.12]  [0.27] [0.16] [0.168]  [0.201] [0.178] 
Trade openness  -0.72  -0.175  -0.971  -0.0893 -0.633  -0.287**  -0.221 -0.445  -0.303 
 [0.59]  [0.12]  [0.67]  [0.12]  [0.48] [0.14] [0.662]  [0.595] [0.494] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  -1.439**  -0.307**  -1.784** 0.0393  -1.507***  -0.480***  -2.660***  -2.035** -2.057*** 
 [0.59]  [0.13]  [0.71]  [0.13]  [0.47] [0.15] [0.948]  [0.797] [0.644] 
Lagged FPI/FDI    0.844***    0.883***    0.771***      
   [0.0190]    [0.0174]    [0.0204]      
Observations 661  607  608  567  746  682  182  197  222 
Within R-squared  0.12    0.19    0.16    0.22  0.17  0.17 
Number of countries  40  38  34  32  47  45  32  38  45 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of FPI stock over FDI stock. The predicted severity of liquidity shock from Column 1 to 6 is based on Column 2 of Table 
3. Columns 1-2 are for opacity measured by opacity factor; Columns 3 and 4 are for opacity measured by CIFAR; Columns 5 and 6 are for opacity measured by 
WEF. The values of opacity indexes are given in Table 6. The predicted severity of liquidity shock from Columns 7 to 9 is based on Column 4 of Table 3. 
Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation clustered at the country level. All estimations include year fixed-effects.*, ** and *** 
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Table 9.  Probit Estimation of Liquidity Crisis 
 
  Column 1  Column 2 
  Next Year  Coming Three Years 
    
GDP, log  -0.126*  -0.216** 
 [0.074]  [0.099] 
GDP per capita, log  -0.152  -0.398*** 
 [0.10]  [0.14] 
Political stability  -0.0225***  -0.0176** 
 [0.0079]  [0.0085] 
Current Account Balance/GDP  -0.0581***  -0.0536*** 
 [0.016]  [0.015] 
Debt/GDP 0.00103*  0.00239** 
 [0.00062]  [0.00099] 
Trade openness  -0.401**  -0.502** 
 [0.19]  [0.24] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  0.597*  0.24 
 [0.31]  [0.34] 
US interest rate  0.124**  0.0899** 
 [0.048]  [0.040] 
Observations 911  911 
    
Number of countries  65  65 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the liquidity crisis dummy that equals one when the annual 
purchase of foreign assets has a negative value.  The liquidity crises in our sample are listed in 
Table 8. Standard errors adjust for heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation clustered at 
the country level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 




Table 10. Second Stage - Probit estimation 
 
  Column 1   Column 2 Column 3 Column 4  Column 5 






Probability of Crisis next year  1.961**  1.696***  2.582**  2.882***  2.010* 
  [0.90] [0.48] [1.03]  [1.04] [1.14] 
GDP,  log  -0.218 -0.394 -0.144  -0.058 -0.164 
  [0.14] [1.20] [0.14]  [0.14] [0.16] 
GDP per capita, log  0.291*  -0.678  0.253*  0.374**  0.173 
  [0.16] [0.43] [0.14]  [0.17] [0.18] 
Trade openness  -0.26  0.195  -0.173  0.00227  -0.201 
  [0.46] [0.26] [0.46]  [0.43] [0.51] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  -0.898*  -0.388  -1.340**  -1.109  -0.751 
  [0.50] [0.25] [0.61]  [0.72] [0.74] 
Lagged  FPI/FDI   0.712***      
   [0.042]      
Observations  911 811 271  222 171 
Number  of  countries  65 59 59  58 58 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of FPI stock over FDI stock. The predicted probably of crisis is 
estimated from Column 1 of Table 9.  All estimations include year fixed-effects.  Standard errors adjust for 
heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation clustered at the country level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 




Table 11. Second Stage-Probit estimation (three years ahead) 
 
  Column 1  Column 2  Column 3  Column 4  Column 5 






Probability of  a crisis in three years   2.372***  1.873***  3.123***  3.217***  2.899*** 
  [0.82]  [0.50] [0.92]  [0.87] [0.97] 
GDP, log  -0.104  -1.035  -0.0105  0.0638  -0.00641 
  [0.14]  [1.09] [0.14]  [0.13] [0.15] 
GDP per capita, log  0.448***  -0.771*  0.467***  0.578***  0.404** 
  [0.17]  [0.44] [0.16]  [0.18] [0.20] 
Trade openness  -0.0811  0.316  0.0302  0.14  0.064 
  [0.46]  [0.26] [0.46]  [0.41] [0.47] 
Real exchange rate (lag)  -0.825*  -0.353  -1.244**  -0.985  -0.73 
  [0.47]  [0.25] [0.59]  [0.68] [0.67] 
Lagged FPI/FDI (log)    0.718***       
   [0.043]       
Observations  911  811 271  222 171 
Number  of  countries  65  59 59  58 58 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of FPI stock over FDI stock. The predicted probably of a crisis in the coming 
three years is estimated from Column 2 of Table 9.  All estimations include year fixed-effects. Standard errors adjust 
for heteroskedasticity and within cluster correlation clustered at the country level. *, ** and *** indicate statistical 
significance at less than the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 